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Abstract
We study arbitrage opportunities, market viability and utility maximization in
market models with an insider. Assuming that an economic agent possesses an ad-
ditional information in the form of an FT -measurable random variable G, we give
criteria for the No Unbounded Profits with Bounded Risk property to hold, char-
acterize optimal arbitrage strategies, and prove duality results for the utility max-
imization problem faced by the insider. Examples of markets satisfying NUPBR
yet admitting arbitrage opportunities are provided for both atomic and continuous
random variables G.
Key words: Initial enlargement of filtration, optimal arbitrage, No Unbounded Prof-
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study arbitrage opportunities and utility maximization in
market modes with an insider. Insider information is typically modeled by using the
mathematical theory of enlargement of filtration, where one distinguishes initial, suc-
cessive and progressive enlargement. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the setting of
initial enlargement by a random variable G: at time zero the insider knows the realiza-
tion of G, which the ordinary agents only observe at the end of the trading period that
we shall assume to be finite. Note that some concepts of arbitrage under initial enlarge-
ment and progressive enlargement on an infinite horizon have recently been studied in
[1] and [2].
Insider trading under initial enlargement of filtration has been the object of interest
of many papers, including but by no means limited to [12, 3, 16, 6, 7, 4, 32, 17]. The
majority of these papers work in a complete market setting and are concerned with
∗The research of Chau Ngoc Huy was supported by Natixis Foundation for Quantitative Research and
the ”Lendu¨let” grant LP2015-6 of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The research of Peter Tankov was
supported by the chair “Financial Risks” sponsored by Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale.
1
the question of additional utility of the insider; they find that when the variable G is
FT -measurable and not purely atomic, this additional utility is often infinite.
In contrast to these papers, our main interest lies in exploring various concepts of
arbitrage in the context of initial filtration enlargement. In particular, we are interested
in the following questions.
• When does the market for the insider satisfy the property NUPBR (no unbounded
profit with bounded risk)? The NUPBR condition, see [24], or, equivalently, No
Arbitrage of the first kind (NA1) (see also NAA1 in [23], and BK in [22]), boils
down to assuming that no positive claim, which is not identically zero, may be
superhedged at zero price. It is the minimal condition enabling one to solve
portfolio optimization problems in a meaningful way: in [24] it is shown that,
without NUPBR, one has either no solution or infinitely many. NUPBR is robust
with respect to changes of numeraire, absolutely continuous measure change
and, in some cases, change of reference filtration (see e.g. [15]). Finally, it is
also known [24] that NFLVR (the classical assumption of no free lunch with
vanishing risk) is equivalent to NUPBR plus the classical no arbitrage assump-
tion (NA), which means that markets with NUPBR can still admit (unscalable)
arbitrage opportunities.
• When does the market for the insider admit optimal arbitrage? We say that a
financial market admits optimal arbitrage if there exists a strategy which allows
to superhedge a unit amount with an initial cost which is strictly less than one
in some states of nature (note that the initial cost of a strategy for the insider
may be a random variable since the insider possesses a nontrivial information
already at time t = 0). We say that the optimal arbitrage is strong whenever the
replication cost is strictly less than one with probability one. In other words,
an optimal arbitrage strategy allows to replicate a risk-free zero coupon bond
at a price which is strictly less than the initial price of this bond (see [8] for
possible uses of such strategies in the context of asset liability management for
e.g., pension funds).
To address the above questions, we distinguish the cases when the additional infor-
mation is represented by a discrete (atomic) random variable G and when it is given by
a random variable G which is not purely atomic. The discrete case is the easier one,
and allows us to provide full answers to the above questions. Namely, the following
results are shown to be true under natural assumptions in the case when G is discrete.
• The market for the insider satisfies the NUPBR property.
• If the original market (for non-informed agents) is complete, then the market
for the insider admits strong optimal arbitrage. If the original market is incom-
plete, the optimal arbitrage may or may not exist, and we give examples of both
situations.
The case when G is not purely atomic is more difficult, and only partial answers
to the above questions are provided in this paper for this case. Our first contribu-
tion here is to establish a new necessary condition for the insider market to satisfy the
NUPBR property. This condition is, in particular, violated by all complete markets,
which means that complete markets always admit an arbitrage of the first kind. In the
incomplete markets the situation is less clear, and we provide examples of both an in-
complete market violating NUPBR and of an incomplete market for which NUPBR
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holds and logarithmic utility of the insider is finite, although the market admits arbi-
trage opportunities.
In addition to the above results, we also address the problem of utility optimization
for the insider. In this context, our contribution is two-fold. First, we show that the
utility maximization problem for the insider may be expressed in terms of the quantities
(strategies, martingale measures) defined in the original market for the uninformed
agents. This in turn allows us to develop an extension of the classical duality results for
utility maximization to market models with an insider. These results are first obtained
in the case of a discrete initial information G, and then extended to a non purely atomic
G with a limiting procedure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the market
model and recall the basic notions of no-arbitrage and filtration enlargement.
In section 3 we deal with initial enlargement by a discrete random variable G. We
show that, under a suitable assumption, a market initially enlarged with a discrete r.v.
G always satisfies NUPBR. In subsection 3.1 we then study optimal arbitrage that can
be implemented via superhedging. We show that the superhedging price of a given
claim for the insider may be represented in terms of the superhedging prices in the
filtration of ordinary agents of the claim restricted to the events corresponding to the
various possible values of G. In subsection 3.2 we consider portfolio optimization, in
particular the maximization of expected utility and obtain a duality relationship. An
example computation of optimal arbitrage and maximal expected log-utility for the
insider in an incomplete market is presented in subsection 3.3.
In section 4 we study the initial enlargement with a random variable G, which is not
purely atomic. We first show that if the set of possible martingale densities is uniformly
integrable, then NUPBR cannot hold. We then present an approximation procedure
allowing to obtain results for a general random variable G by a limiting procedure
from the results obtained for a discrete variable G in section 3. This procedure allows
us to extend the results on utility optimization to the case of general G in subsection
4.3. Finally, the Appendix contains some technical proofs.
2 Market model and preliminaries related to filtration
enlargement
In this section we introduce our basic market model and recall known concepts as we
shall use them in the sequel (subsection 2.1). We then introduce some preliminaries in
relation to filtration enlargement (subsection 2.2).
2.1 Market model and basic notions
On a stochastic basis (Ω,F ,F,P), where the filtration F= (Ft)t≥0, t ≤ T satisfies the
usual conditions, consider a financial market with an Rd−valued nonnegative semi-
martingale process S = (S1, . . . ,Sd), t ≤ T , where the components represent the prices
of d risky assets. The horizon is supposed to be finite and given by T > 0. We as-
sume that the price processes are already discounted, namely for the riskless asset
price S0 we assume S0 ≡ 1, and that this market is frictionless. Let L(S) be the set of
all Rd−valued S−integrable predictable processes and, for H ∈ L(S) denote by H · S
the vector stochastic integral of H with respect to S.
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Definition 2.1. An investment strategy H is an element H ∈ L(S), where the compo-
nents indicate the number of units invested in the individual assets. Letting x ∈ R+,
an H ∈ L(S) is said to be an x−admissible strategy, if H0 = 0 and (H · S)t ≥ −x for
all t ∈ [0,T ],P−a.s. H ∈ L(S) is said to be admissible if it is x−admissible for some
x ∈ R+. We denote by Ax the set of all x−admissible strategies and by A that of
all admissible strategies. For (x,H) ∈ R+×A we define the portfolio value process
V x,Ht := x+(H ·S)t implying that x is the amount of the initial wealth and that portfo-
lios are generated only by self-financing admissible strategies. Finally, we denote by
Kx the set of all claims that one can realize by x-admissible strategies starting with
zero initial cost:
Kx =
{
V 0,HT | H ∈Ax
}
and K denotes the set of claims that can be replicated with zero initial cost and any
admissible strategy: K = ∪x≥0Kx.
Let
C = (K −L0+)∩L
∞.
In the sequel, we shall use the following no-arbitrage conditions.
Definition 2.2 (NFLVR). We say that there is No Free Lunch with Vanishing Risk if
C ∩L∞+ = {0},
where the closure is taken with respect to the topology of uniform convergence.
Definition 2.3 (NUPBR). There is No Unbounded Profit With Bounded Risk if the set
K1 is bounded in L0, that is, if
lim
c↑∞
sup
W∈K1
P(W > c) = 0
The NUPBR condition can be shown to be equivalent to the following, more eco-
nomically meaningful condition, which boils down to assuming that no positive claim,
which is not identically zero, may be superhedged at zero price with a positive portfolio
(see [21] for a recent discussion of the different equivalent formulations of NUPBR).
Definition 2.4 (NA1). An FT−measurable random variable ξ is called an Arbitrage
of the First Kind if P(ξ ≥ 0) = 1, P(ξ > 0) > 0, and for all x > 0 there exists an
admissible strategy H ∈ Ax such that V x,HT ≥ ξ . We shall say that the market admits
No Arbitrage of the First Kind (NA1), if no such random variable exists.
Definition 2.5 (Classical arbitrage). We shall say that H ∈A is an arbitrage strategy
if P(V 0,HT ≥ 0) = 1 and P(V 0,HT > 0) > 0. It is a strong arbitrage if P(V 0,HT > 0) = 1.
An arbitrage strategy is said to be scalable if H ∈ A0 and unscalable if H ∈ Ax with
x > 0 for some x, but H /∈A0. We shall say that there is absence of classical arbitrage,
denoted by NA, if there are no scalable or unscalable arbitrage strategies, that is,
C ∩L∞+ = {0}.
In our context (nonnegative processes), NFLVR is equivalent to the existence of at
least one equivalent local martingale measure [13]. The set of all such measures will
be denoted by ELMM(F,P) and the set of corresponding densities will be denoted by
ELMMD(F,P). NUPBR is, in turn, equivalent to the existence of a local martingale
deflator [25, 37, 36]. In addition, NFLVR is equivalent to NUPBR plus NA [24].
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2.2 Preliminaries in relation to filtration enlargement
We start again from a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), on which we consider a
financial market with an insider.
Assumption 2.6. The (F,P)-market of regular agents satisfies NFLVR implying that
the set ELMMD(F,P) is not empty. The insider possesses from the beginning an ad-
ditional information about the outcome of some FT−measurable r.v. G with values in
(R,B).
Starting from F= (Ft) one can then consider the (initially) enlarged filtration G=
(Gt) with
Gt = ∩ε>0 (Ft+ε ∨σ(G))
In the context of filtration enlargements it is important to have a criterion which
ensures that an F−local martingale remains a G−semimartingale. In view of introduc-
ing the corresponding condition, let νt := P{G ∈ dx | Ft} be the regular conditional
distribution of G, given Ft , and ν := P{G ∈ dx} be the law of G. We shall require
Jacod’s condition (see [18]) in the following form
Assumption 2.7. (Absolutely continuous version of Jacod’s condition). We assume
that
νt ≪ ν, P− a.s. for t < T.
Notice that the absolute continuity is imposed only before the terminal time T . In
our setting, where G ∈ FT , the absolute continuity cannot hold at the terminal date.
Some papers on insider trading require that νt ∼ ν (see, e.g., [4]) but this would imply
that the density of νt with respect to ν is strictly positive and so allow one to construct
an equivalent martingale measure from the density process before the terminal time T
[4]. This would imply NFLVR for the (G,P)−market (before time T ) and thus exclude
arbitrage possibilities there, which is not our purpose.
We need one more assumption, which refers to the density process of νt with re-
spect to ν . To this effect we first recall from Lemme 1.8 and Corollaire 1.11 of [18]
that we can choose a nice version of the density, namely we have the following lemma
where O(F) denotes the F-optional sigma field on Ω×R+.
Lemma 2.8. Under Assumption 2.7, there exists a nonnegative B⊗O(F)-measurable
function R×Ω×R+ ∋ (x,ω , t) 7→ pxt (ω) ∈ [0,∞), ca`dla`g in t such that
1. for every t ∈ [0,T ), we have νt(dx) = pxt (ω)ν(dx).
2. for each x ∈ R, the process (pxt (ω))t∈[0,T ) is a (F,P)-martingale.
3. The processes px, px− are strictly positive on [0,τx) and px = 0 on [τx,T ), where
τx := inf{t ≥ 0 : pxt− = 0 or pxt = 0}∧T.
Furthermore, if we define τG(ω) := τG(ω)(ω) then P[τG = T ] = 1.
The conditional density process pG is also the key to find the semimartingale de-
composition of an F−local martingale in the enlarged filtration G.
We come now to the announced additional assumption
Assumption 2.9. For every x, the process px does not jump to zero, i.e.
P[τx < T, pxτx− > 0] = 0.
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This assumption is used in [26] for a general construction of strict local martingales,
in [35] for a construction of markets with arbitrages and in [10] for the study of optimal
arbitrage when agents have non equivalent beliefs. This assumption is also used to
prove the preservation of NUPBR in the enlarged market over an infinite horizon, see
[1] or Theorem 6(a) of [2].
3 Enlargement with a discrete random variable
In this section we consider the case when the random variable G of the (initial) en-
largement is a discrete random variable G ∈ {g1, . . . ,gn}, with n≥ 2 and P[G = gi]> 0
for all i. After a general theorem concerning NUPBR for this case, we study optimal
arbitrage in subsection 3.1 and provide a dual representation for expected utility maxi-
mization in subsection 3.2. An example for computing optimal arbitrage and maximal
expected utility for the insider is presented in subsection 3.3 for the case of an incom-
plete market.
Notice first that the initial enlargement with a discrete random variable is a classical
case studied already by P. A. Meyer [30] and by many other authors. For this case it
is known that every F−local martingale is a G−semimartingale on [0,T ] and it is not
necessary to impose Jacod’s condition. We shall however make the Assumption 2.9.
In the discrete case the insider can update her belief with a measure change P→ Qi
thereby dismissing all scenarios not contained in {G = gi}. The measure Qi satisfies
dQi
dP
∣∣
Ft
=
P{G = gi |Ft}
P{G = gi}
:= pgit (1)
It gives total mass to {G = gi} and is absolutely continuous but not equivalent to P.
The following theorem shows that NUPBR always holds true in this setting.
Theorem 3.1. Let G be discrete and suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true.
Then the (G,P)−market satisfies NUPBR.
Proof. The statement is proved by way of contradiction, noticing that NUPBR is equiv-
alent to NA1. Assume that there is an arbitrage of the first kind in the (G,P)-market,
i.e., we can find an FT -measurable random variable ξ (because FT = GT ) such that
P[ξ ≥ 0] = 1,P[ξ > 0]> 0 and for all ε > 0, there exists a G-predictable strategy HG,ε
which satisfies
ε +(HG,ε ·S)T ≥ ξ , P− a.s. (2)
Choose an index i such that P[{ξ > 0}∩{G = gi}] > 0. The inequality (2) still holds
true under Qi in the form of
ε +(HG,ε1G=gi ·S)T ≥ ξ , Qi− a.s. (3)
Let us look at the hedging strategy HG,ε1G=gi under Qi. Recall that (see [20]) the
predictable process HG,ε is of the form HG,εt (ω) = ht(ω ,G(ω)) where ht(ω ,x) is a
P(F)×B(R)−measurable function with P(F) denoting the F−predictable σ−algebra
on Ω×R+. Then HG,ε,i := h(ω ,gi) is F−predictable and we have the representation
HG,ε 1{G=gi} = ˜H
F,ε,i1{G=gi} where ˜H
F,i,ε is a F-predictable strategy. Thus (3) implies
that ξ is an arbitrage of the first kind in the (F,Qi)-market, which is equivalent to
the failure of NUPBR in the Qi-market. Notice next that, for each i ∈ {1, ...,n}, the
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(F,Qi)-market is obtained from the (F,P)-market by an absolutely continuous mea-
sure change, see (1). Furthermore, the density process pgi does not jump to zero, by
Assumption 2.9. By Theorem 4.1 of [10] this implies that the condition NUPBR holds
for the (F,Qi)-market thus proving the contradiction and with it the statement.
Recently Acciaio et al. [1] gave sufficient conditions for NUPBR to hold in the
(G,P)−market by constructing a martingale deflator under G (see also the introductory
part to section 4 below). The construction of local martingale deflators is also given
in Proposition 10 (for quasi left-continuous F-local martingales), Proposition 11, and
Theorem 6 of [2]. However they work on an infinite horizon requiring the absolute
continuity in Jacod’s hypothesis to hold at all times and so their approach cannot be
adapted to our finite horizon case.
Theorem 3.1 shows that, under the Assumption 2.9, the (G,P)−market satisfies
NUPBR; it does not exclude that it satisfies also NFLVR. This depends on the possi-
bility of classical arbitrage in the various specific cases. The study of such arbitrage
opportunities is the subject of the next section.
3.1 Optimal arbitrage via superhedging
The notion of optimal arbitrage goes back to [14]. Here, following [10], we relate
optimal arbitrage to superhedging. We start from a definition of the superhedging price
which is adapted to the context of filtration enlargement. Whenever in the sequel the
filtration may be either F of G, we shall use the symbol H ∈ {F,G}.
Definition 3.2. Let H ∈ {F,G} and let f ≥ 0 be a given claim. An H0-measurable
random variable xH∗ ( f ) is called the superhedging price of f with respect to H if there
exists an H-predictable strategy H such that{
xH∗ ( f )+ (H ·S)t ≥ 0, P− a.s,∀t ∈ [0,T ],
xH∗ ( f )+ (H ·S)T ≥ f , P− a.s. (4)
and, if any x ∈H0 satisfies these conditions, then xH∗ ( f ) ≤ x, P−a.s.
In other words, the superhedging price of f is the essential lower bound of the
initial values of all nonnegative admissible portfolio processes, whose terminal value
dominates f . Notice that G0 is non trivial implying that the superhedging price xG∗ ( f )
is a random variable. However, this price is constant on each event {G = gi}.
We come next to the superhedging theorem that shows how the superhedging price
and a superhedging strategy for f in G can be obtained in terms of the superhedging
price and the associated strategy in F by restricting f to the individual events {G= gi}.
Theorem 3.3. Let G be discrete and suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true.
Then,
i) The superhedging price for a claim f ≥ 0 in the (G,P)−market is given by
xG∗ ( f ) =
n
∑
i=1
xF∗ ( f 1{G=gi})1{G=gi}
ii) The associated hedging strategy is ∑ni=1 HF,i1{G=gi} where HF,i is the superhedg-
ing strategy for f 1{G=gi} in the (F,P)−market, i.e.
n
∑
i=1
xF∗ ( f 1{G=gi})1{G=gi}+
n
∑
i=1
(
HF,i1{G=gi} ·S
)
T
≥ f , P− a.s.
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Remark 3.4. Using this theorem, the computation of the superhedging price for the
insider reduces to the computation of the superhedging price for the uninformed agents
in the original market, which satisfies NFLVR. In particular, using the classical super-
hedging duality, we may write
xG∗ ( f ) = ∑
i
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
Z f 1{G=gi}
]
1{G=gi}.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, here we also make use of Theorem 4.1 in [10],
which relates the superhedging price under a measure P to that under a measure Q,
with respect to which P is only absolutely continuous, but not necessarily equivalent.
The role of the measure Q in [10] will be played here by the measure P and that of P in
[10] by the various measures Qi defined in (1). To make clear which measure is being
used, in this proof we shall use the notation xF,P∗ (·) or xF,Q
i
∗ (·) respectively.
Theorem 4.1 of [10] leads to
xF,Q
i
∗ ( f ) = xF,P∗ ( f 1G=gi).
For each i, we denote by HF,i the F-predictable strategy which superhedges f in the
(F,Qi)-market, that is
xF,Q
i
∗ ( f )+ (HF,i ·S)T ≥ f , Qi− a.s.
This inequality holds also under P when restricted on {G = gi}, namely
xF,P∗ ( f 1G=gi)1G=gi +(HF,i1G=gi ·S)T ≥ f 1G=gi , P− a.s.
Summing up these inequalities we obtain(
∑
i
xF,P∗ ( f 1G=gi)1G=gi
)
+
((
∑
i
HF,i1G=gi
)
·S
)
T
≥ f , P− a.s.
The hedging strategy
(
∑i HF,i1G=gi
)
is G-predictable.
Finally, we prove that the initial capital ∑i xF,P∗ ( f 1G=gi)1G=gi is exactly the super-
hedging price of f in the (G,P)-market. Assume that y is a G0-measurable random
variable such that
y+(HG ·S)T ≥ f , P− a.s.
where HG is a G-predictable strategy. Hence,
y1G=gi +(H
G1G=gi ·S)T ≥ f 1G=gi , P− a.s.
Because Qi ≪ P with Qi[G = gi] = 1, we obtain
y+(HG1G=gi ·S)T ≥ f , Qi− a.s.
By using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can replace HG on the
various events {G = gi} by an F-predictable strategy ˜HF,i and then
y+( ˜HF,i ·S)T ≥ f , Qi− a.s.
By definition, the superhedging price of f under Qi is not greater than y and so we
conclude that ∑i xF,P∗ ( f 1G=gi)1G=gi ≤ y,P− a.s.
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We now give a specific definition of a market with optimal arbitrage which is
adapted to the context of initial filtration enlargement and is motivated by Lemma 3.3
in [10].
Definition 3.5. There is optimal arbitrage in the (H,P)−market if xH∗ (1) ≤ 1 and
P{xH∗ (1) < 1} > 0. If xH∗ (1) < 1,P− a.s. then the optimal arbitrage is said to be
strong.
From this definition and Theorem 3.3 it follows that there is optimal arbitrage for
the insider if and only if xF∗ (1{G=gi}) < 1 for some i. If the market is complete, then
xF∗ (1{G=gi}) = E
P[Z1{G=gi}] < 1 for all i, where Z is the density of the unique mar-
tingale measure. Therefore, in a complete market there always exists strong optimal
arbitrage.
It follows from Remark 3.4 in [10] that, under NUPBR, one has xH∗ (1) > 0 P-a.s.
However, xH∗ (1)> 0 does not imply NUPBR (see [29] for a market model that does not
satisfy NUPBR, but satisfies NA, which implies xH∗ (1)> 0).
3.2 Expected utility maximization for an insider
This subsection concerns utility maximization. We first formulate the precise relation-
ship between absence of arbitrage, in particular NUPBR, and utility maximization, and
then show that expected utility maximization in the enlarged market can be performed
by an analog of classical duality also under absence of an ELMMD.
Given a concave and strictly increasing utility function U(·), the corresponding
portfolio optimization problem is given by
u(x) := sup
H∈Ax
E
{
U(V x,HT )
}
Recall that it is shown in [24] that, if NUPBR fails, then u(x) = +∞ for all x > 0 or the
problem has infinitely many solutions. This result implies immediately the following
statement, which we formulate as a proposition because of its importance. It holds in
general and not only in the specific case of this section.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that the utility function is strictly increasing, concave, and
satisfies U(+∞) = +∞. If there exists x > 0 for which u(x)<+∞, then NUPBR holds.
In particular, a criterion allowing to show that NUPBR holds is thus to show that
e.g. the log-utility maximization leads to a finite value. Notice, however, that NUPBR
does not imply that expected utility is finite.
We now discuss the duality approach for utility maximization. Before stating the
main theorem, we prove one preliminary lemma. This lemma, which we state for a
general increasing function, shows that it is possible to relate the expected utility of the
insider to the expected utility of regular agents when restricted to the events {G = gi}.
In this lemma and below we denote by A F1 and A G1 the set of 1-admissible strategies
that are predictable with respect to F and G respectively.
Lemma 3.7. Let U be an increasing function. Then,
sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )] =
n
∑
i=1
sup
H∈A F1
EP[U(V 1,HT )1G=gi ]. (5)
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Proof. The proof only requires the representation of G-predictable processes as it was
used in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3. We do not need Assumption 2.9 here.
(≤) Let HG ∈ A G be a G-predictable strategy. As mentioned above, the G-
predictable process HG can be expressed as HGt (ω) = ht(ω ,G(ω)) where ht(ω ,x)
is a P(F)×B(R)-measurable function. Then, HF,i = h(ω ,gi) is F-predictable and
HG1G=gi = HF,i1G=gi a.s. Hence, we have that HG = ∑ni=1 HF,i1G=gi and therefore∫ T
0
HGt dSt =
n
∑
i=1
1G=gi
∫ T
0
HF,it dSt ,
where the equality follows from the fact that S is a G-semimartingale. Consequently
EP[U(V 1,H
G
T )] =
n
∑
i=1
EP
[
1G=giU
(
V 1,H
F,i
T
)]
,
where we used the fact that U is increasing to take the expectation since it implies that
both expressions under the E sign are bounded from below. Taking the supremum over
the set of all G-admissible strategies we obtain the inequality (≤) in (5).
(≥) Let HF,i, i = 1, . . . ,n be F-predictable strategies. Then, the strategy HG =
∑ni=1 HF,i1G=gi is G-predictable and the following straightforward inequality completes
the proof.
n
∑
i=1
EP
[
1G=giU(V
1,HF,i
T )
]
= EP[U(V 1,H
G
T )]≤ sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )].
The following theorem leads to a new characterization of the expected utility of
the insider in terms of the additional information G and the set of all local martingale
densities of the (F,P)-market.
Theorem 3.8. Let G be discrete, suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true, and
assume that
(i) The function U : (0,∞)→ R is strictly concave, increasing, continuously differ-
entiable and satisfies the Inada conditions at 0 and ∞.
(ii) For every y ∈ (0,∞), there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P) with EP[V (yZ)]< ∞, where
V (y) = supx(U(x)− xy).
Then,
sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )] = ∑
i
inf
y>0
{
y+ inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP [V (yZT )1G=gi ]
}
.
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.7, it suffices to show that for every i,
sup
H∈A F1
EP[1G=giU(V
1,H
T )] = infy>0
{
y+ inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP [V (yZT )1G=gi ]
}
.
Following the reasoning in the latter part of the proof of Theorem 3.1 that relates the
(F,Qi)−markets to the (F,P)−market and using Assumption 2.9, one can again use
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Theorem 4.1 in [10] to show that the (F,Qi)-market satisfies the condition NUPBR.
Furthermore, for any local martingale density Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P), the process Z/pgi is
a local martingale deflator for the (F,Qi)-market (note that on {G = gi}, pgit > 0 for all
t).
Let us next introduce the following subsets of L0+
C (x) = {v ∈ L0+ : 0≤ v≤ xV
1,HF
T ,P− a.s. for some H
F ∈A F1 },
D(y) = {z ∈ L0+ : 0≤ z≤ yZT ,P− a.s. for some Z ∈ ELMM(F,P)},
C
i(x) =
{
vi = v,Qi− a.s. for some v ∈ C (x)
}
,
D
i(y) =
{
zi =
z
pgiT
,Qi− a.s. for some z ∈D(y)
}
.
Because the (F,P)-market was assumed to satisfy NFLVR, Proposition 3.1 of [28]
implies that C and D are convex with the following properties
v ∈ C (1) ⇐⇒ EP[vz]≤ 1, for all z ∈D(1),
z ∈D(1) ⇐⇒ EP[vz]≤ 1, for all v ∈ C (1).
These imply that for every i,
vi ∈ C i(1)⇔ EQ
i
[vizi]≤ 1, for all zi ∈D i(1),
zi ∈D i(1)⇔ EQ
i
[vizi]≤ 1, for all vi ∈ C i(1).
and thus the assumption (3.1) of [31] holds for C i(1) and D i(1) under the measure Qi.
In addition, C i and D i contain at least one strictly positive element.
Define, following [31], the optimization problems
u(x) = sup
ξ∈C i(x)
EQ
i
[U(ξ )] and v(y) = inf
η∈D i(y)
EQ
i
[V (η)].
For all y > 0, the finiteness of v(y) follows from the assumptions of the Theorem. Fur-
thermore, since x∈C i(x), we have u(x)>−∞ for all x> 0. An application of Theorem
3.2 of [31] then shows that u and v satisfy biconjugacy relations so that in particular
u(x) = infy>0(v(y)+ xy). Taking x = 1 and substituting the explicit expression for Qi,
the proof is complete.
From Theorem 3.8, one immediately obtains more explicit expressions for the case
of power and logarithmic utility functions.
Corollary 3.9. Fix γ ∈ (0,1). Let G be discrete, suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9
hold true, and that there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P) with EP[(ZT )−
γ
1−γ ]< ∞. Then,
sup
H∈A G1
EP[(V 1,HT )
γ ] = ∑
i
{
inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
(ZT )−
γ
1−γ 1G=gi
]}1−γ
.
Corollary 3.10. Let G be discrete, suppose that Assumptions 2.6 and 2.9 hold true,
and that there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P) with EP[logZT ]>−∞. Then
sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ] =−∑
i
P[G = gi] logP[G = gi],
+∑
i
inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
1G=gi log
1
ZT
]
.
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To conclude this subsection, we shall compare our result for the logarithmic utility
with the results in [4]. Let the additional expected log-utility of the insider be denoted
by
∆(F,G) := sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ]− sup
H∈A F1
EP[logV 1,HT ].
In the approach of [4], the quantity ∆(F,G) is represented by the information drift, see
Definition 3.6 in their paper, and in our approach, it can be expressed as
−
n
∑
i=1
P[G = gi] logP[G = gi]+
n
∑
i=1
inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
1G=gi log
1
ZT
]
− inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
log 1
ZT
]
. (6)
If the market is complete, then the two approaches end up with the same result: the
quantity in (6) reduces to the entropy of G, which is exactly what is stated in Theorem
4.1 of [4].
3.3 Example
In this subsection we present an explicit example which corresponds to an incomplete
market. A complete market example based on the standard Brownian motion is given
in [11].
Suppose that N1 and N2 are two independent Poisson processes with common in-
tensity λ = 1. We consider a financial market with the (discounted) risky asset price
St = eN
1
t −N2t whose dynamics is given by
dSt = St−
(
(e− 1)dN1t +(e−1− 1)dN2t
)
, S0 = 1, t ∈ [0,T ].
The public informationF is generated by the two Poisson processes N1,N2. The (F,P)-
market satisfies the NFLVR condition, and the density Z of any equivalent local mar-
tingale measure is of the form
dZt = Zt−
(
(α1t − 1)(dN1t − dt)+ (α2t − 1)(dN2t − dt)
)
, (7)
where α1,α2 are positive integrable processes satisfying α1t = e−1α2t .
Let us define Nt := N1t −N2t and assume that the insider knows the value of NT ,
and hence of ST , at the beginning of trading. The insider’s filtration is thus Gt = Ft ∨
σ(NT ) = Ft ∨σ(ST ). An easy computation shows that for all t ∈ [0,T ),
pxt =
P[NT = x|Ft ]
P[NT = x]
=
∑k≥0 e−(T−t) (T−t)
k
k! e
−(T−t) (T−t)k+x−Nt
(k+x−Nt )! 1k+x−Nt≥0
∑k≥0 e−T T kk! e−T T
x+k
(x+k)!
> 0
and for t = T
pxT =
1NT=x
∑k≥0 e−T T kk! e−T T
x+k
(x+k)!
.
Since the density pxt is strictly positive before time T , Assumption (2.9) is fulfilled.
Theorem 3.1 allows then to conclude that the (G,P)-market satisfies NUPBR.
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3.3.1 Optimal arbitrage.
By Theorem 3.3, the superhedging price of 1 under G is
xG,P∗ (1) = ∑
x∈Z
xF,P∗ (1NT =x)1NT=x.
To check whether optimal arbitrage exists, we need to compute
xF,P∗ (1NT=x) = sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x]
for every x ∈ Z. This is the goal of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11. If x≤ 0, we have
xF,P∗ (1NT =x) = sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x] = 1
and there is no optimal arbitrage. If x > 0, we have that
xF,P∗ (1NT=x) = sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x] =
1
ex
and the optimal arbitrage strategy is the strategy in which the agent buys 1ST units of
the risky asset and holds them until maturity.
Proof. First, we consider the case x ≤ 0. Let us define τ = inf{t : Nt = x}. We fix
two constants M > m > 0 and choose α1t = M1t≤τ +m1t>τ . The process α1t , and
consequently also α2t , is thus bounded implying that for the density Z one has EP[ZT ] =
1 (see [9, Theorem VI.T4]). Denote by PM,m the corresponding martingale measure.
For this measure, the following inequality holds true.
sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x]≥ EP
M,m
[1NT=x]≥ P
M,m
[τ ≤ T ;N1t = N1τ ,N2t = N2τ ∀t ∈ [τ,T ]].
By the strong Markov property, N1τ+s −N1τ and N2τ+s −N2τ are independent Poisson
processes with intensities m and em, independent from Fτ . Therefore,
P
M,m
[τ ≤ T ;N1t = N1τ ,N2t = N2τ ∀t ∈ [τ,T ]]≥ P
M,m
[τ ≤ T ]Pm[N1t = 0,N2t = 0 ∀t ∈ [0,T ]]
= P
M,m
[τ ≤ T ]e−m(1+e)T ,
where Pm is the probability measure under which N1 is a Poisson process with intensity
m and N2 is a Poisson process with intensity em. On the other hand, up to time τ , N1
and N2 are independent Poisson processes with intensities M and eM. Therefore,
P
M,m
[τ ≤ T ] = PM
[
inf
0≤t≤T
(N1t −N2t )≤ x
]
= P
1
[
inf
0≤t≤MT
(N1t −N2t )≤ x
]
Letting m go to zero and M go to infinity and using the dominated convergence theo-
rem, we obtain
sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x]≥ P
1
[
inf
t≥0
(N1t −N2t )≤ x
]
= 1,
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because N1t −N2t →−∞ under P
1
as t → ∞. So, the first statement holds true.
Coming next to the case x > 0, we notice that e−x is an upper bound for the supre-
mum. Indeed, for any ELMM P, it holds that
P[NT = x]≤ P[ST ≥ ex]≤
EP[ST ]
ex
≤
1
ex
.
Repeating the computations as in the first case, we obtain
sup
P∈ELMM(F,P)
P[NT = x]≥ EP
M,m
[1NT=x] = P
M
[τ ≤ T ]e−m(1+e)T
= P
1
[
sup
0≤t≤MT
(N1t −N2t )≥ x
]
e−m(1+e)T .
It thus suffices to show that
f (x) := P1
[
sup
t≥0
(N1t −N2t )≥ x
]
=
1
ex
.
Let τ1,τ2 be the first jump times of N1 and N2, respectively. Because τ1 ∼ Exp(1) and
τ2 ∼ Exp(e) are independent under P
1
, the random variable τ1
eτ2
has the density 1
(1+t)2 ,
thanks to Lemma 4.12, and thus,
P
1
[τ1 < τ2] = P
1
[
τ1
eτ2
<
1
e
]
=
1/e∫
0
1
(1+ t)2
dt = 1
1+ e
.
From its definition, we have f (0) = 1 and for x≥ 1 it then follows that
f (x) = P1
[
sup
t≥0
(N1t −N2t )≥ x|τ1 > τ2
]
P[τ1 > τ2]
+P
1
[
sup
t≥0
(N1t −N2t )≥ x|τ1 ≤ τ2
]
P[τ1 ≤ τ2]
=
e f (x+ 1)
1+ e
+
f (x− 1)
1+ e
.
Therefore, we obtain f (x+ 1)− f (x) = f (x)− f (x−1)
e
and thus
f (x) = 1− (1− f (1))1− e
−x
1− e−1
.
Because limx→∞ f (x) = 0, we have that f (1) = e−1 and then f (x) = e−x.
Now we show that the buy and hold strategy is optimal. Because the insider knows
the value of ST = eNT , the buy and hold strategy, consisting of 1ST units of the risky
asset, superreplicates the claim 1. In fact
1
ST
+
1
ST
T∫
0
1dSu = 1.
For this the insider needs the initial capital e−x on the event NT = x.
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3.3.2 Expected log-utility.
By Corollary 3.10 the expected log-utility of the insider is
sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ] =−∑
x∈Z
P[NT = x] logP[NT = x]− ∑
x∈Z
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP [1NT=x logZT ] .
Choosing a specific strategy H in the left-hand side, we obtain a lower bound for the
log utility, and a specific equivalent martingale measure density Z in the right-hand side
provides an upper bound. We are going to construct H and Z for which the two bounds
coincide. As a preliminary step, we are going to evaluate the intensities of N1 and N2
under G.
Intensities of N1 and N2 under G Let λG,1,λG,2 be the intensities of N1,N2 under
G, respectively. Introduce a further larger filtration Ht = Ft ∨σ(N1T ,N2T ). Under H,
we obtain that
dN1t −
N1T −N1t
T − t
dt, dN2t −
N2T −N2t
T − t
dt (8)
are martingales, see Theorem VI.3 of [33]. Now, Lemma 4.14 of the Appendix implies
that the processes
N1t −
∫ t
0
E
[
N1T −N1s
T − s
∣∣∣∣Gs
]
ds, N2t −
∫ t
0
E
[
N2T −N2s
T − s
∣∣∣∣Gs
]
ds (9)
are martingales under G and so
λG,1t = E
[
N1T −N1t
T − t
∣∣∣∣Gt
]
(10)
=
1
T − t
E
[
N1T −N1t | N1T −N1t −N2T +N2t
]
=
1
T − t
f 1t (N1T −N1t −N2T +N2t ),
where
f 1t (y) = E[N1T−t |N1T−t −N2T−t = y] =
E[N1T−t1N1T−t−N2T−t=y]
P[N1T−t −N2T−t = y]
.
This computation can be made explicit. For example, if y > 0,
f 1t (y) =
∑k≥0(y+ k)P[N2T−t = k]P[N1T−t = y+ k]
∑k≥0P[N2T−t = k]P[N1T−t = y+ k]
=
∑k≥0(y+ k) (T−t)
2k+y
k!(y+k)!
∑k≥0 (T−t)
2k+y
k!(k+y)!
=
(T − t)Iy−1(2(T − t))
Iy(2(T − t))
,
where Iα(x) is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind1. A similar computation
for y≤ 0 shows that for all integer y,
f 1t (y) =
(T − t)I|y−1|(2(T − t))
I|y|(2(T − t))
,
1The modified Bessel functions of the first kind is defined by the series representation Iα (x) =
∑m≥0 1m!Γ(m+α+1)
(
x
2
)2m+α
, for a real number α which is not a negative integer, and satisfies I−n(x) = In(x)
for integer n
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so that finally
λG,1t =
I|NT−Nt−1|(2(T − t))
I|NT−Nt |(2(T − t))
and λG,2t =
I|NT−Nt+1|(2(T − t))
I|NT−Nt |(2(T − t))
.
Upper bound by duality From equation (7), we get
EP[1NT=x logZT ] = E
P

1NT=xEP

 2∑
i=1
T∫
0
logα it dNit −
T∫
0
(α it − 1)dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣G0



 .
Since we are only interested in an upper bound, we can restrict the discussion to equiv-
alent local martingale densities for which
E
[∫ t
0
logα is(dNis−λG,is )
∣∣∣G0
]
= 0 a.s. (11)
In this case, the above expectation becomes
EP[1NT=x logZT ] = E
P

1NT=x 2∑
i=1
T∫
0
(
λG,it logα it − (α it − 1)
)
dt

 (12)
= EP

1NT=x
T∫
0
(
λG,1t logα1t −α1t +λG,2t log(eα1t )− eα1t
)
dt


The expression
λG,1t logα1t −α1t +λG,2t log(eα1t )− eα1t
is concave as function of α1t , with unique maximum attained at
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+ 1
Fix ε > 0 and let α1t =
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+1 10≤t≤T−ε + 1T−ε<t≤T , and α
2
t = eα
1
t . These values
are bounded on [0,T ] implying that the corresponding density satisfies EP[ZT ] = 1 and
(11). Plugging it into (12), we obtain
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP [1NT=x logZT ]≥ E
P

1NT=x
T∫
T−ε
(
−1− e+λG,2t
)
dt


+EP

1NT =x
T−ε∫
0
(
log
(
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+ 1
)
(λG,1t +λG,2t )−λG,1t + 2
)
dt

 .
When ε → 0, the expression under the two expectations is bounded from below and
converges monotonically to
1NT=x
T∫
0
(
log
(
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+ 1
)
(λG,1t +λG,2t )−λG,1t + 2
)
dt,
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which shows that
∑
x∈Z
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP [1NT=x logZT ]
≥ EP

 T∫
0
(
log
(
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+ 1
)
(λG,1t +λG,2t )−λG,1t + 2
)
dt

 , (13)
and in particular the right-hand side is finite (by the duality result).
3.3.3 A lower bound by direct computation
Let piG be a G-predictable strategy, which denotes the ratio invested in the risky asset,
and let V 1,piG be the corresponding self-financing wealth process that starts from x = 1
and whose dynamics are
dV 1,pi
G
t
V 1,pi
G
t−
= piGt
dSt
St−
= piGt
(
(e− 1)dN1t +(e−1− 1)dN2t
)
.
The logarithm of V 1,piG satisfies
d logV 1,pi
G
t = log
(
1+(e− 1)piGt
)
dN1t + log
(
1+(e−1− 1)piGt
)
dN2t
=
(
log
(
1+(e− 1)piGt
)
λG,1t + log
(
1+(e−1− 1)piGt
)
λG,2t
)
dt +G-local martingale.
Since we are only looking for a lower bound, we can restrict the discussion to strategies
for which the coefficients in front of N1 and N2 are bounded and the local martingale
above is a true martingale. Taking the expectation of both sides, we obtain that
EP
[
logV 1,pi
G
T
]
= EP

 T∫
0
(
log
(
1+(e− 1)piGt
)
λG,1t + log
(
1+(e−1− 1)piGt
)
λG,2t
)
dt

 .
(14)
The expression under the integral sign is concave in piGt and is maximized by
λG,1t (e− 1)+λG,2t (e−1− 1)
(e− 1)(1− e−1)(λG,1t +λG,2t )
∈
(
−
1
e− 1
,
1
1− e−1
)
.
Fix ε ∈ (0,1), define τε = inf{t > 0 : λG,1t /∈ (ε,ε−1) or λG,2t /∈ (ε,ε−1)}∧T and let
piGt =
λG,1t (e− 1)+λG,2t (e−1− 1)
(e− 1)(1− e−1)(λG,1t +λG,2t )
1t≤τε .
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Substituting this into (14), we then get
EP
[
logV 1,pi
G
T
]
= EP

 τε∫
0
(
λG,1t log
(e+ 1)λG,1t
λG,1t +λG,2t
+λG,2t log
(1+ e−1)λG,2t
λG,1t +λG,2t
)
dt


=−EP

 τε∫
0
(
(λG,1t +λG,1t ) log
λG,1t +λG,2t
e+ 1
−λG,1t + 2
)
dt


+EP

 τε∫
0
(
λG,1t logλG,1t +λG,2t log(λG,1t )−λG,1t −λG,2t + 2
)
dt

 .
When ε → 0, τε → T and the first expectation above clearly converges to (13). To
finish the proof, it remains to check that
EP

 T∫
0
(
λG,1t logλG,1t +λG,2t log(λG,1t )−λG,1t −λG,2t + 2
)
dt
∣∣∣NT = x

=− logP[NT = x],
for x ∈ Z.
To this end, let Mt = P[NT = x|Ft ]. By direct computation, we obtain that Mt =
e−2(T−t)I|x−Nt |(2(T − t)). The change of variable formula then yields
MT =M0+
∫ T
0
e−2(T−t)(I|x−Nt−1|−I|x−Nt |)(dN
1
t −dt)+
∫ T
0
e−2(T−t)(I|x−Nt+1|−I|x−Nt |)(dN
2
t −dt),
and further, on the event NT = x,
logMT = logM0 +
∫ T
0
logλG,1t dN1t +
∫ T
0
logλG,2t dN2t −
∫ T
0
(
λG,1t +λG,2t − 2
)
dt.
Finally, we may conclude that
− logP[NT = x] =− logM0 =−E[logM0|NT = x]
= E
[∫ T
0
logλG,1t dN1t +
∫ T
0
logλG,2t dN2t −
∫ T
0
(
λG,1t +λG,2t − 2
)
dt
∣∣∣NT = x
]
= E
[∫ T
0
logλG,1t λG,1t dt +
∫ T
0
logλG,2t λG,2t dt−
∫ T
0
(
λG,1t +λG,2t − 2
)
dt
∣∣∣NT = x
]
provided we may show that
E
[∫ T
0
log2 λG,1t λG,1t dt
]
< ∞.
To see this, observe that from the asymptotics of the Bessel function it follows that
| logλG,1t | ≤C| log(T − t)| log(1+ |NT −Nt |).
Plugging this into the above estimate and using (10), we finally have
E
[∫ T
0
log2 λG,1t λG,1t dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
C2| log2(T − t)| log2(1+ |NT −Nt |)
N1T −N1t
T − t
dt
]
,
which is easily shown to be bounded (use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality plus the estimate
E[NαT ] = O(T ) for α > 0).
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4 Initial enlargement with a general random variable
We now consider the case when the FT−measurable random variable G, which rep-
resents the insider information, is not purely atomic as it was the case in the previous
section.
It is usually observed that in this case the value of logarithmic utility of the insider
is infinite, as for example in Theorem 4.4 of [32] where the insider has exact informa-
tion about at least one stock’s terminal price, or in [4] where the insider’s additional
expected logarithmic utility is related to the entropy of G. This difficulty appears at T ,
the time when the conditional law of G given FT is a Dirac measure and hence Jacod’s
condition fails.
Since, as we saw before, NUPBR is the minimal condition for well-posed expected
utility maximization problems, it is useful to have conditions for NUPBR to hold. [1]
and [2] give a sufficient condition so that NUPBR holds underG in infinite time horizon
settings. Their idea is that, if the processes px and S do not jump to zero at the same
time, then one can construct an equivalent (local) martingale deflator (ELMD) under
G and it is known that the existence of such an ELMD implies NUPBR. However,
in finite horizon settings, it may happen that the process px is not well-defined at T ,
making it impossible to define an ELMD because px appears in the denominator of
such an ELMD.
In this paper we consider a finite horizon T > 0 and, in the present section, we
shall study arbitrage properties and expected utility maximization for the case of a
non-atomic G. Before coming to utility maximization, in the next subsection we show
that if G is non-atomic and the set of local martingale densities ELMMD(F,P) is uni-
formly integrable, then there always exists an arbitrage of the first kind and so NUPBR
fails. It shows in particular that, if the (F,P) market is complete, then NUPBR al-
ways fails under G. This negative message implies that the non-uniform integrabil-
ity of ELMMD(F,P) is a necessary condition for NUPBR under G. This result is
then accompanied by two examples: one where the set of local martingale densities
ELMMD(F,P) is uniformly integrable, and one where it is not. In the second example
the expected log-utility is finite, which gives (see Proposition 3.6) a sufficient condi-
tion for NUPBR to hold. On the other hand, in this second example the insider has
non-scalable arbitrage opportunities so that NFLVR cannot hold. Initial filtration en-
largement with a non-atomic FT -measurable random variable may therefore lead to
viable market models which allow for economically meaningful unscalable arbitrages.
4.1 Arbitrage of the first kind
The following result does not require Assumption 2.9.
Proposition 4.1. (Arbitrage of the first kind) Assume that
• The law of G is not purely atomic,
• The set of densities of equivalent local martingale measures ELMMD(F,P) is
uniformly integrable.
Then there exists an arbitrage of the first kind for the insider.
Proof. Let us choose B ⊂ R such that B does not contain any atoms of G and P[G ∈
B] = c > 0. For each n, let (Bni )1≤i≤n be a partition of B such that P[G∈ Bni ] = c/n. We
are going to show that 1G∈B is an arbitrage of the first kind, in the sense of Definition
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2.4. First, consider the superhedging price of 1G∈Bni and its associated hedging strategy
HF,i in the (F,P)-market (see Corollary 10 in [13]), for which
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP[ZT 1G∈Bni ]+ (H
F,i ·S)T ≥ 1G∈Bni .
Therefore,
n
∑
i=1
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP[ZT 1G∈Bni ]1G∈Bni +
((
n
∑
i=1
HF,i1G∈Bni
)
·S
)
T
≥ 1G∈B. (15)
Because the set of all local martingale densities {ZT : Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P)} is uniformly
integrable, for any ε > 0 there exists K > 0 such that
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP[ZT 1ZT>K ]≤ ε.
The initial capital in (15) can then be estimated by
n
∑
i=1
sup
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
(
EP[ZT 1Z>K1G∈Bni ]+E
P[ZT 1ZT≤K1G∈Bni ]
)
1G∈Bni
≤
n
∑
i=1
(ε +KP[G ∈ Bni ])1G∈Bni =
n
∑
i=1
(
ε +K
c
n
)
1G∈Bni .
We can choose ε and n such that the initial capital in (15) is arbitrarily small and thus
the random variable 1G∈B is an arbitrage of the first kind.
Remark 4.2 (A comparison with [4]). The above proposition extends Theorem 4.4
of [4]. More precisely, [4] show that the insider’s additional expected logarithmic
utility up to time T becomes infinite (which implies that NUPBR fails). However, their
results apply only to continuous processes and require an even stronger condition than
market completeness, namely that the inverse of pG may be represented as a stochastic
integral, see condition (45) therein. By our result, we are able to construct unbounded
profits in general market settings. In particular, the following example shows that the
property of uniform integrability may also hold for some incomplete market models.
Example 4.3 (Incomplete market with uniformly integrable set of equivalent martin-
gale densities). We consider a risky asset whose (discounted) price evolves as
dSt = St−σ(t)(θdN1t +(1−θ )dN2t − dt)
where θ ∈ (0,1) and σ(t) is a continuous function which is not constant on [0,T ]. The
filtration F is generated by the two independent standard Poisson processes N1 and N2.
Any martingale density has the form (7) where now α1 and α2 are positive predictable
integrable processes satisfying θα1t +(1−θ )α2t = 1,P− a.s. Therefore,
0≤ α1 ≤ 1θ , 0≤ α
2 ≤
1
1−θ .
These inequalities lead to an upper bound for all martingale densities:
ZT = e−
∫ T
0 (α
1
t +α
2
t −2)dt
N1T∏
i=1
α1ti
N2T∏
j=1
α2t j ≤ e
2T 1
θ N1T
1
(1−θ )N2T
.
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As a result, the set of martingale densities is uniformly integrable. Let (T 1i )i≥1 and
(T 2j ) j≥1 be the jump times of N1 and N2 respectively. Because σ is a continuous
function, the random variables σ(T 1i ),σ(T 2j ) are continuous and not constant. This
means that the random variable
G = ST = exp

− T∫
0
σ(s)ds

 N1T∏
i=1
(
1+θσ(T1i )
) N2T∏
j=1
(
1+(1−θ )σ(T2j )
)
is a non-atomic random variable for which the market of the insider does not satisfy
NUPBR.
In the literature there are examples of incomplete market models where NUPBR
holds and therefore the set of equivalent martingale densities is not uniformly inte-
grable. The following one is due to [27].
Example 4.4 (Incomplete market where NUPBR holds but NFLVR fails). The market
model in this example consists of a risk-free asset paying zero interest and a single
risky asset driven by a Le´vy process with two-sided jumps. The public information F is
the natural filtration generated by a Brownian motion W and two independent Poisson
processes N1,N2 with common intensity λ = 1. The risky asset is St = exp(Mt) where
Mt =Wt +N1t −N2t is a F-martingale. The dynamics of S under F is
dSt = St−
(
dWt +
1
2
dt +(e− 1)dN1t +(e−1− 1)dN2t
)
.
Let HF be an F- self-financing strategy and denote by piF the fraction of wealth invested
in the stock. The associated wealth is V v,piF satisfying
dV v,pi
F
t
V v,pi
F
t−
= piFt
dSt
St−
, V v,pi
F
0 = v.
The strategy piF is admissible if for all t ∈ [0,T ] we have that V v,piFt ≥ 0,P− a.s. The
insider has the additional information given by the final value of S so that Gt = Ft ∨
σ(ST ) = Ft ∨σ(MT ). In [27] it is shown that all admissible strategies are bounded
and the expected logarithmic utility for an insider is bounded from above. This entails
that the (G,P)-market satisfies NUPBR (see Proposition 3.6). Furthermore, the insider
has arbitrage opportunities since he knows the final value of S. For example, if he
knows that ST > 1, which happens with positive probability, he could buy the asset S
and hold it until maturity; being S0 = 1, this implies a riskless profit.
4.2 An approximation procedure
Assume that we are given a non purely atomic random variable G ∈R representing the
information of the insider. Let {Γni , i = 1, ...,n} be a finite increasing partition of R+
and denote
σ(Gn) = σ ({G ∈ Γni }, i = 1, ...,n) .
We approximate σ(G) by the increasing sequence of sigma algebras σ(Gn)
σ(Gn)⊂ σ(Gn+1)⊂ ...σ(G) = σ
(⋃
n≥1
σ(Gn)
)
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and define an increasing sequence of filtrations Gn =(G nt )t∈[0,T ], where G nt =
⋂
ε>0 Ft+ε ∨
σ(Gn). For each n, we shall use the results from Section 3 to compute the expected
utility under Gn, the information at level n. The convergence properties given below in
this section will then enable us to obtain the corresponding results under G.
First we have to make sure that for each Gn−market we can indeed apply the results
from Section 3 which are shown under Assumption 2.9. Since in the Gn−market the
insider’s information is given by σ ({G ∈ Γni }, i = 1, · · · ,n), we need to show that for
all integers n and i the quantities P[G∈Γ
n
i |Ft ]
P[G∈Γni ]
do not jump to zero. This is the object of
the following assumption.
Assumption 4.5. For every a < b, the F-martingale
p(a,b)t (ω) :=
P[G ∈ (a,b)|Ft ](ω)
P[G ∈ (a,b)] =
1
P[G ∈ (a,b)]
b∫
a
pxt (ω)P[G ∈ dx]
does not jump to zero.
The main result of this subsection is now the following convergence result
Proposition 4.6. For any G-predictable strategy HG, there exists a sequence of (Gn)-
predictable strategies (HGn)n such that for every t ∈ [0,T ], HGnt → HGt almost surely.
Proof. By definition of the predictable σ -field, we can find a sequence of ca`gla`d G-
adapted processes (HG,n)n such that for every t ∈ [0,T ], HG,nt → HGt almost surely.
Moreover, without loss of generality, the processes (HG,n)n may be assumed to be
bounded.
Let {T ni }
n≥1
0≤i≤n be a sequence of (deterministic) partitions of the interval [0,T ] such
that for every n,
0 = T n0 < T n1 < · · ·< T nn = T
and limn→∞ max0≤i≤n−1 |T ni+1−T ni |= 0. For a ca`gla`d G-adapted process X , define the
process Xn by Xn0 = X0 and
Xnt =
n−1
∑
i=0
XTi1]Ti,Ti+1](t),
for 0 < t ≤ T . Then, Xn is G-adapted and for every t ∈ [0,T ], Xnt → Xt almost surely.
Finally, let Y be a process of the form
Yt =
k
∑
i=0
yTi 1]Ti,Ti+1](t),
where, for each i, yTi is a bounded GTi measurable random variable, and Ti is a deter-
ministic time such that 0 = T0 < T1 < · · ·< Tn = T . We define
YG
n
t :=
k
∑
i=1
E[yTi |G
n
Ti ]1]Ti,Ti+1](t).
The process YGn is Gn-predictable. Using Le´vy’s “Upward” Theorem (see Theorem
II.50.3 of [34]), we obtain E[yTi |G nTi ]→ yTi ,P− a.s., which means that for every t ∈
[0,T ], YGnt → Yt almost surely. Combining the three approximations described above
gives the proof of the proposition.
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4.3 Expected utility maximization
Analogously to subsection 3.2 we consider now the expected utility maximization and
a dual representation of the optimal value for the case of a non purely atomic G. Based
on Proposition 3.6, this will then allow one to show NUPBR under Assumption 2.9 by
using the finiteness of expected utility.
We start with the main convergence result
Theorem 4.7. Let U : R→ R+ be increasing and continuous and suppose that S is a
continuous semimartingale. Then,
lim
n→∞
sup
H∈A Gn1
EP[U(V 1,HT )] = sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )].
Proof. The inequality ≤ is trivial since U is increasing and A Gn1 ⊂A G1 . To prove the
opposite inequality, we choose HG ∈ A G1 . Our first aim is to show that HG may be
supposed to be bounded. Indeed, the stochastic integral HG · S is defined as the H 2-
limit of H1|H|≤n · S = H+1|H|≤n · S−H−1|H|≤n · S, see [33, Section IV.2], and by the
dominated convergence theorem for stochastic integrals [33, Theorem IV.32], this limit
is attained uniformly in compacts in probability, and hence also almost surely along a
subsequence. Introduce the stopping time
τnε = inf{t > 0 : 1+ ε +
∫ t
0
H1|H|≤ndS≤ 0}∧T.
Observe that
1+ ε +
∫ t∧τnε
0
H1|H|≤ndS ≥ 0, t ∈ [0,T ],
which means that the strategy defined by 11+ε H1|H|≤n1t≤τnε belongs to A
G
1 . The uni-
form convergence of the stochastic integrals implies that P[τnε = T ]→ 1 as n→∞, and
also
1+
∫ T
0
1
1+ ε
H1|H|≤n1t≤τnε dS→ 1+
1
1+ ε
∫ T
0
HtdSt
as n→ ∞. By Fatou’s lemma we then have
E
[
U
(
1+ 1
1+ ε
∫ T
0
HtdSt
)]
≤ liminf
n
E
[
U
(
1+
∫ T
0
1
1+ ε
H1|H|≤n1t≤τnε dS
)]
,
and another application of Fatou’s lemma shows that
E
[
U
(
1+
∫ T
0
HtdSt
)]
≤ liminf
ε↓0
E
[
U
(
1+ 1
1+ ε
∫ T
0
HtdSt
)]
.
This argument shows that
sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )] = sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )],
where A G1 denotes the strategies in A G1 which are bounded by a deterministic constant.
Therefore, from now on we may (and will) assume H to be bounded by a constant C.
Now let (Hn) be a sequence of strategies approximating H in the sense of Proposi-
tion 4.6, which may be assumed to be bounded by the same constant C. Once again,
by the dominated convergence theorem for stochastic integrals, we show that Hn · S
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converges to H ·S uniformly on compacts in probability, and hence also almost surely
along a subsequence. Similarly to the previous part, we construct an admissible strat-
egy from Hn by stopping it at a suitable stopping time. An application of Fatou’s lemma
then shows that
liminf
n→∞
sup
H∈A Gn1
EP[U(V 1,HT )]≥ sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )].
Observing that the expression under the limit in the left hand side is increasing in n and
combining this with the opposite inequality, we conclude the proof.
Remark 4.8. Extending the result of Theorem 4.7 to discontinuous processes seems
to be a difficult task, see in particular Example 11.2.6 in [5]. One may, for example,
obtain such an extension under the following condition which is not easy to verify in
practice:
For every ε > 0 there exists a strategy H ∈A G1 with
EP[U(V 1,HT )]≥ sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )]− ε,
and, for a number n ≥ 1, a sequence of Gn-predictable integrable processes
(Hm) as well as a sequence of Gn-stopping times (τm) with P[τm = T ]→ 1, such
that for every m≥ 1, ∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
(Hmt −Ht)dSt
∣∣∣∣≤ ε
for all t ≤ τm.
As a corollary to Theorems 4.7 and 3.8, we obtain a dual representation for the
utility maximization problem in the case of non-atomic G.
Theorem 4.9. Let S be a continuous semimartingale, suppose that Assumptions 2.6
and 4.5 hold true, and assume that
(i) The function U : (0,∞)→ R is strictly concave, increasing, continuously differ-
entiable and satisfies the Inada conditions at 0 and ∞.
(ii) For every y ∈ (0,∞), there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P) with EP[V (yZ)]< ∞, where
V (y) = supx(U(x)− xy).
Then,
sup
H∈A G1
EP[U(V 1,HT )] = limn→∞∑i infy>0
{
y+ inf
Z∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
V (yZT )1G∈Γni
]}
.
In the case of logarithmic utility, a more explicit expression may be obtained.
Corollary 4.10. Let S be a continuous semimartingale, suppose that Assumptions 2.6
and 4.5 hold true, and assume that G has a continuous density f (x) and a finite entropy
and that there exists Z ∈ ELMMD(F,P) with EP[logZT ] > −∞. Then the insider’s
expected log-utility is
sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ] =−
∫
f (x) log f (x)dx
+ lim
n→∞
n
∑
i=1
(
− log |Γni |P[G ∈ Γni ]+ infZ∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
1G∈Γni log
1
ZT
])
.
(16)
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Proof. Theorem 4.7 and Corollary 3.10 show that
sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ] = limn→∞
n
∑
i=1
(
−P[G ∈ Γni ] logP[G ∈ Γni ]+ infZ∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
1G∈Γni log
1
ZT
])
(17)
Now we consider the first term in the right hand side. Using the mean value theorem,
we have that P[G ∈ Γni ] = f (xni )|Γni | for some xni ∈ Γni . Thus,
−P[G ∈ Γni ] logP[G ∈ Γni ] =−P[G ∈ Γni ] log( f (xni )|Γni |)
=− f (xni ) log f (xni )|Γni |−P[G ∈ Γni ] log |Γni |.
Letting n tend to infinity, we get the result.
As a consequence, the insider’s log-utility problem is finite if G has finite entropy
and for every event {G ∈ Γni }, there exists a martingale density ZT such that the quan-
tity EP[1G∈Γni log(1/ZT )] can compensate the term − log |Γ
n
i |P[G ∈ Γni ]. In complete
markets, it is impossible to find such a martingale density for each event, implying that
expected log-utility of the insider is infinite. In incomplete markets, the result provides
us with a new criterion for NUPBR under G as stated in the following
Corollary 4.11. Under Assumption 2.9, if there exists a constant C < ∞ such that for
all a and all ε > 0 small enough,
sup
Z∈ELMMD
E[1G∈(a,a+ε) logZT ]≥−P[G ∈ (a,a+ ε)] logP[G ∈ (a,a+ ε)]
−CP[G ∈ (a,a+ ε)] (18)
then the condition NUPBR holds under G.
Proof. Consider (17) for partitions of the form Γni = (ai,ai + εn) with εn ↓ 0. Using
then (18) in (17) one obtains
sup
H∈A G1
EP[logV 1,HT ] = limn→∞
n
∑
i=1
(
−P[G ∈ Γni ] logP[G ∈ Γni ]+ infZ∈ELMMD(F,P)
EP
[
1{G∈Γni } log
1
ZT
])
≤ lim
n→∞
n
∑
i=1
CP[G ∈ Γni ] =C.
The expected log-utility of the insider is bounded and hence, by Proposition 3.6, the
condition NUPBR holds under G.
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Appendix
Lemma 4.12. Assume that X ,Y are two independent exponential random variables
with parameters α,β , respectively. Then the random variable Z = αXβY has density
1/(1+ z)2.
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Proof. For z > 0. we compute the cumulative distribution of Z
P[Z ≤ z] = P
[
Y ≥
αX
β z
]
=
∞∫
0


∞∫
(αx)/(β z)
β e−β ydy

αe−αxdx
=
∞∫
0
e
−αx
z αe−αxdx = z
1+ z
.
The density of Z is obtained by taking derivative of the cumulative distribution of Z
with respect to z.
Definition 4.13 (Optional projection - Definition 5.2.1 of [19]). Let X be a bounded (or
positive) process, and F a given filtration. The optional projection of X is the unique
optional process oX which satisfies
E[Xτ 1τ<∞] = oXτ 1τ<∞
almost surely for any F-stopping time τ.
The following result helps us to find the compensator of a process when passing to
smaller filtrations.
Lemma 4.14. Let G,H be filtrations such that Gt ⊂ Ht , for all t ∈ [0,T ]. Suppose
that the process Mt := Xt −
t∫
0
λudu is a H-martingale, where λ ≥ 0. Then the process
MGt := Xt −
t∫
0
oλudu is a G-martingale, where oλ is the optional projection of λ onto
G.
Proof. Since λu ≥ 0, the optional projection oλ exists and for fixed u, it holds that
oλu = E[λu|Gu] almost surely. If 0 ≤ s < t and H is bounded and Gs-measurable, then,
by Fubini’s Theorem
E[H(MGt −M
G
s )] = E[H(Xt −Xs)]−
t∫
s
E[HE[λu|Gu]]du
= E[H(Xt −Xs)]−
t∫
s
E[Hλu]du
= E[H(Mt −Ms)] = 0.
Hence MG is a G-martingale.
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